ABSTRACT With the fast development of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), IIoT storage, which provides a lower cost, higher reliability of data, remote access services, and expandable storage space, is received much attention among enterprises and individual users. However, providing a secure IIoT storage service could be a challenging task for some situations, for example, how to search encrypted data in the IIoT. In this paper, we examine the security of a recent proposed certificateless searchable public key encryption scheme for IIoT environments by Ma et al. We find that their scheme is insecure against an off-line keyword guessing attack. Then, we propose an enhancement based on the scheme and prove the security of our enhancement with a formal model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) [1] - [4] is the network of physical devices which contain embedded technology such as sensors [5] , [6] , RFID and network connectivity [7] , [8] to communicate with other devices or external environment. This has led to new avenues for connecting technologies and businesses in various areas such as health care, transportation, commerce, data mining [9] - [13] etc. The phrase IoT was firstly proposed by MIT Auto-ID Center in 1999 [14] . Now IoT has become a popular topic of research in both academia and industry.
Recently, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [15] , the IoT used in industry for advanced manufacturing, receives increasing attention. Along the continuous development of IIoT, IIoT cloud storage, which excels in remote access service, low cost, high data reliability, large and expandable storage space, is becoming more and more popular among enterprises and individual users. A typical network environment for IIoT storage is depicted in Fig. 1 . In this environment, the enterprise collects the data during the industrial production and operating status of equipments.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. Meanwhile, other outside information are collected by sensors. Then, these data are sent to the cloud via the Internet. The cloud server can interact with the computing server and the storage server and is responds to computing and storing of the data.
However, due to the fact that cloud data management is out of the supervision of enterprise and individual users, many sensitive information is easily leaked. Therefore, cloud service providers must ensure that the data collected by the sensors are securely stored. In order to prevent privacy data leakage, the most straightforward method is let sensors encrypt their data. However, it would lead to another problem. That is, when a user needs to retrieve the encrypted data, cloud server cannot response the request since the server does not have the encryption key.
Aiming at the search problem of encrypted data, Boneh et al. [16] proposed the first searchable public key encryption (SPKE) scheme in traditional pairing-based cryptosystems. This scheme allows a data owner (or a sensor) has their encrypted data hosted on a cloud server while a data user, who is capable in decrypting the data, can access a particular piece of data by making a query to the server. This query, which is also encrypted, however allows the server to retrieve a set of encrypted data fulfilling the query. In principle both data user and data owner do not need to trust the cloud server, which is indeed not always trustworthy, but at the same time no one other than them shall know the content of the data nor the query of the data user. This framework was used in some subsequent works [17] , [18] .
In 2008, Baek et al. [19] proposed a new SPKE scheme with designated server, namely SCF-MPEKS. Beak et al.'s framework first introduced the server role and pointed out that the attacker can be divided into malicious servers and external attackers. However, Rhee et al. [20] pointed out SCF-MPEKS suffered from an off-line keyword guessing attack. They also proposed an enhanced framework. In 2010, Rhee et al. [21] proposed a variant of SCF-MPEKS scheme called SCF-dMPEKS. Meanwhile, they defined a new security notion called ''trapdoor indistinguishability'' which provides formal provably secure of SPKE schemes to against off-line keyword guessing attacks [22] - [31] .
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [32] proposed the concept of certificateless public key cryptosystem (CLPKC) to solve the key escrow problem in identity (ID)-based public key cryptosystems [33] - [36] . After that SPKE schemes designed in CLPKC were received much attentions by cryptographers in [37] - [39] . Recently, Ma et al. [40] proposed a new SPKE scheme based on CLPKC called SCF-MCLPEKS which not only eliminates the certificate management but also prevents the key escrow problems. Their scheme is the first certificateless-based SPKE scheme applied to IIoT environment and provides a higher efficiency and security (provable secure) as well as solving the search problem of encrypted data and providing a powerful guarantee in IIoT cloud storage.
In this paper, we inspect Ma et al.'s SCF-MCLPEKS scheme and found that SCF-MCLPEKS is in fact insecure against an off-line keyword guessing attack. Under this attack a malicious server, or an attacker having control over the public channel can retrieve the content of query issued by the data user, which is supposed to be private. This implies the attacker will learn the attributes of the encrypted data. Take an concrete example, say a data user wish to retrieve documents with the meta-data ''confidential''. The attacker will first gain the knowledge of the query is about searching ''confidential'' documents. From the reply of the server he also know which encrypted documents is confidential. This attack brings severe problem and cannot be ignored.
In order to overcome the proposed attack, we present a modified security model and a modified SCF-MCLPEKS (called SCF-MCLPEKS + ) based on their scheme. Finally, we prove that our enhancement can resist off-line keyword guessing attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review Ma et al's scheme and then in Section III, point out the drawbacks of their scheme. We also propose our enhancement. In Section VI, we formally prove the security of our enhancement and demonstrate its performance in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. REVIEW OF MA et al.'s SCF-MCLPEKS SCHEME
In this section, we briefly review Ma et al.'s SCF-MCLPEKS scheme [40] , including the underlying mathematical method (pairing) and the detailed scheme.
A. BILINEAR PAIRING AND HARD PROBLEM
Here, we refer literatures [33] - [36] , [39] , [41] to present a review of the pairings and hard problem that plays an important role in this paper. 
B. DETAILED SCF-MCLPEKS SCHEME
The detailed SCF-MCLPEKS scheme can be described as follows:
Setup. Inputting a security parameter k, the KGC executes the following steps to generate the required system parameters.
1) To generate a bilinear map e :
2) To select a master key s ∈ R Z * q . Then, computing P pub = s · P, where P is a generator of G 1 
Set-Public-Key. Server's public key and receiver's public key are defined by PK S = x S · P and PK R = x R · P, respectively.
MCLPKES. Inputting param, ID S , PK S , ID R , PK R , and n keywords w i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, data owner generates cipher-
Test. Inputting param, T w , SK S , and C i , server verifies
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND OUR ENHANCEMENT OF SCF-MCLPEKS
In this section, we first point out that Ma et al.'s SCF-MCLPEKS scheme suffered from an off-line keyword guessing attacks. In order to overcome this attack, we propose a modified framework and an enhancement based on SCF-MCLPEKS.
A. DRAWBACKS OF SCF-MCLPEKS
Here, we demonstrate that Ma et al.'s SCF-MCLPEKS scheme suffered from an off-line keyword guessing attack. Note that, ''off-line keyword guessing attack'' means that attacker can test the linkability between keyword and trapdoor while the attacker captured a trapdoor. In other words, this attack will lead violating ''trapdoor indistinguishability'', if it success. We assume a PPT external attacker A or a malicious sever S can capture a valid trapdoor T w . The goal of A (or S) is to recover w i ∈ W from T w , where W is a set of all possible keywords. The details are described as follows:
B. OUR MODIFIED FRAMEWORK OF SCF-MCLPEKS
In this subsection, we refer literatures [39] , [42] Note that, for the original framework of SCF-MCLPEKS please refer to [40] .
C. OUR ENHANCEMENT
In this section, we propose an enhancement named as SCF-MCLPEKS + . Our enhanced scheme is proposed as follows.
Setup. Given security parameter k, it generates the needed parameters param = {k, Set-Public-Key. Data owner's public key PK O = x O · P 1 , data user's public key PK R = x R · P 1 , and server's public key PK S = x S · P 1 are computed by the same way in SCF-MCLPEKS.
MCLPKES. Inputting param, SK O , ID S , PK S , ID R , PK R , and n keywords w i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, data owner returns ciphertext {C 1 , C 2 , C 3,1 , C 3,2 , . . . , C 3,n } for w i as follows.
1) Selecting
Inputting param, w i , SK R , PK S , and PK O , data user executes the following steps to generate trapdoor T w i .
The trapdoor T w i of w i is defined by
Test. Inputting param, T w i , the server's private key SK S , and ciphertext C W , the server verifies e(C 1 ,
The correctness of SCF-MCLPEKS + can be seen as below:
S .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first refer literatures [39] , [40] , [42] , [43] to define a new security model of our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + . Then, we show that the security of our enhancement.
A. SECURITY MODEL OF SCF-MCLPEKS +
We assume that there are adversary A and challenger C in the following games, where A may make some queries to C and it answers A honestly. Note that there are two types of adversaries named type I (A I ) and type II (A II ) in certificateless public key cryptosystems. The ability of A I is set to disallow querying master key and the ability of A II hasn't this limitation. In other words, A I is to simulate an external attacker and A II is to simulate a malicious server in SCF-MCLPEKS + . 
2) TRAPDOOR INDISTINGUISHABILITY
Note that, the definitions about the system setup phase, query issuing phase, Public-Key Replacing request, and more queries phase are same as in the above game. 
B. SECURITY PROOF OF SCF-MCLPEKS +
In the following proofs, we follow our best knowledge [39] to demonstrate the security of SCF-MCLPEKS + .
1) CIPHERTEXT INDISTINGUISHABILITY
Here, we prove that our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies ciphertext indistinguishability.
Lemma 1: In the random oracle model and based on the BDH problem, SCF-MCLPEKS + scheme provides ciphertext indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen keyword attack for any A I adversary.
Proof: In order to prove this lemma, we design a simulation, called Game 1, to simulate SCF-MCLPEKS + . In Game 1, we assume that there exists a PPT algorithm C which interacts with A I . Note that the goal of A I is to break SCF-MCLPEKS + scheme and the goal of C is to solve the BDH problem. Game 1 is set as follows.
1) System setup. C generates master key s ∈ Z * q and param. Then, C returns param to A I . 2) Trapdoor query. A I may make this query with
S , and PK (i)
O to C. Upon receiving this request, it computes T
· P 2 , and T
S , where r (i) is a random value and β (i) from H 2 query. Then, C returns trapdoor T (i)
2 ) to A I . Note that, the descriptions about H 1 query, H 2 query, Partial-Private-Key-Extract query, Private-Key-Extract query, Public-Key-Retrieve query, and Public-Key-Replacing request are similar to [39] In the same time, C chooses (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and outputs
as its guess, where β is a value in the challenge phase. If A I 's guess is correct, then it must compute C 3 = e(C 1 , PK R )
· e(Q R + Q S , P pub ) r for either b = 0 or 1. Therefore, setting P pub = aP 1 , C 1 = bP 1 , and Q R = cP 1 for some a, b, c unknown, C can compute e(P 1 , P 1 ) abc by A I as follows.
abc .
Lemma 2:
In the random oracle model and based on the BDH problem, SCF-MCLPEKS + scheme provides ciphertext indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen keyword attack for any A II adversary.
Proof: In order to prove this lemma, we design a simulation, called Game 2, to simulate SCF-MCLPEKS+. In Game 2, we also assume that there exists a PPT algorithm C which interacts with A II . Note that the goal of A II is to break SCF-MCLPEKS + scheme and the goal of C is to solve the BDH problem. Game 2 is similar to Game 1 described as follows. C chooses (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) and outputs
as its guess. If A II 's guess is correct, then it must compute C 3 = e(C 1 , PK R )
· e(Q R + Q S , P pub ) r for either b = 0 or 1. Therefore, setting PK R = aP 1 , PK O = bP 1 , and H 2 (w b ) · C 1 = cP 1 for some a, b, c unknown, C can compute e(P 1 , P 1 ) abc by A II as follows.
According to the results of Lemmas 1 and 2, we can conclude that our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies ciphertext indistinguishability in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model and based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies ciphertext indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen keyword attack for the two types of adversaries A I and A II .
2) TRAPDOOR INDISTINGUISHABILITY
Here, we prove that our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies trapdoor indistinguishability.
Lemma 3: In the random oracle model and based on the BDH problem, SCF-MCLPEKS + provides trapdoor indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen keyword attack for any A I adversary.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to Lemma 1 except challenge and guess phases. In the same time, C chooses (T 1 , T 2 ) and outputs
as its guess, where β is a value in the challenge phase. If A I 's guess is correct, then it must compute T 1 = D R + x R · β · PK O + r · P 2 and T 2 = r · PK S for either b = 0 or 1. Therefore, setting P pub = aP 1 , Q R = bP 1 , and PK S = cP 1 for some a, b, and c are unknown, C can compute e(P 1 , P 1 ) abc by A I as follows.
Lemma 4: n the random oracle model and based on the BDH problem, SCF-MCLPEKS + scheme provides trapdoor indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen keyword attack for any A II adversary.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4 is similar to Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. and outputs
as its guess. If A II 's guess is correct, than it must compute T 1 = D R + x R · H 2 (w b ) · PK O + r · P 2 and T 2 = r · PK S for either b = 0 or 1. Therefore, setting PK R = aP 1 , H 2 (w b ) · PK O = bP 1 , and PK S = cP 1 for some a, b, c are unknown, C can compute e(P 1 , P 1 ) abc by A II as follows.
According to the results of Lemmas 3 and 4, we can conclude that our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies trapdoor indistinguishability in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: In the random oracle model and based on the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem, our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies trapdoor indistinguishability under an adaptive chosen keyword attack for the two types of adversaries A I and A II .
3) SECURE AGAINST OFF-LINE KEYWORD GUESSING ATTACKS
According to the previous studies in [21] , [39] , they described the linkage between ''off-line keyword guessing attacks'' and ''trapdoor indistinguishability''. In Theorem 2, we have shown that our enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + satisfies trapdoor indistinguishability. Thus, we can conclude that SCF-MCLPEKS + is secure against off-line keyword guessing attacks launched by external attacker based on the results in [21] , [39] .
In other aspect, our SCF-MCLPEKS + adopts data owner's private key in keyword encryption phase (MCLPKES) and data owner's public key in the trapdoor generation phase. For a malicious server, it cannot generate legal keyword ciphertext and then tests the relationship between the ciphertext and the captured trapdoor. Furthermore, this malicious server cannot launch off-line keyword guessing attacks to captured trapdoor without data owner's private key. Thus, our SCF-MCLPEKS + is secure against off-line keyword guessing attacks launched by malicious server.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the computation performance through a series of experiments.
A. THEORETICAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
First, we implement each of the primitive computation cost and summarized them in TABLE 1. This result is similar to the result given in other literature [40] , [44] . The experimental environment is set using the JPBC library [45] and Java 8.0. A Type A curve -The curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F q (where q is 512-bits) is chosen since it is optimized for computation time. On the server side the database PostgreSQL 9.6 is used to record a single table storing <fileID, ownerID, [40] and our enhancement in terms of the keyword encryption, the trapdoor generation, and the test phases for conducting one of these operations under the assumption that the file contains only one keyword and the trapdoor contains only one keyword. The result shows that our performance is also improving along with the security. 
B. THE SCALABILITY OF OUR ENHANCEMENT
A comprehensive experiment has been conducted to study the scalability of protocol where database I/O is also considered as a factor. In a baseline setting we assume each data owner has a file to shared with three data users. Each file contains five keywords. Three testing keywords will be issued by a VOLUME 7, 2019 data user on each query. We study the impact of the following variations against the running time: number of keywords labeled in a file, the number of sharees (data users) per each shared file, and the number of testing keywords queried by the users. The results are shown in Fig 2, 3, 4 . As expected the running time of the data owner and the server grow in linear with the growth of the number of keywords. We can also observe that the computation effort is mainly residing at the client side which is favorable in scalability. In the second experiment we change the number of sharees from 1 to 10 and the running time of the data owner growth linearly while the running time of the server and the owner remains the same. This is expected for the data user since the trapdoor generation does not involve anything about the keyword encryption. With the help of the database, encrypted keywords can be retrieved very fast and cost almost zero overhead on the growth of the number of sharees. In the third experiment the number of testing keywords queried is changed. We again observe that the running time of the server and the data users growth steadily.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we identify the vulnerability of Ma et al's SCF-MCLPEKS scheme and presented an enhancement SCF-MCLPEKS + over their scheme. The enhanced scheme is formally proven and data user's privacy can be protected. The performance of SCF-MCLPEKS + suggested that is practical for some IIoT environments, especially for those has strong need in data storage security.
